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does not deal with the role of nationalism in the making of national support for
the war. In addition, she does not explain to what extent this “national” ideology
took root in the minds of ordinary people.
The final chapter concerns the failure to translate Meishuron Pan-Asianism
into practice within the “Sphere.” Noting the unpreparedness of the occupation
administrators, Hotta argues that the achievement of the proclaimed “sphere of
mutual respect and prosperity” was “a task beyond Japan’s capacity” (p. 199).
Indeed, when put into practice, Pan-Asianism became synonymous with Japani-
zation through Japanese language education, production of propaganda pieces,
and youth training (pp. 203–4). In studying these Japanese cultural policies
and training programs, Hotta could have delved more deeply into the perspec-
tives of the local people. When she does introduce the voices of local “students,”
she quotes interviews in secondary sources and does not specify the time and
context in which these interviews took place. Moreover, although she discusses
the legacies and impact of the Japanese occupation on the Southeast Asia, only
in a few cases does she consider the reverse phenomenon. Hotta attributes the
failure of the cultural policies to the fact that the Japanese practitioners of
Pan-Asianism were unable to overcome their own dilemmas regarding their
nationalism and Pan-Asianism (p. 221). A closer look at the mutual influence
between the Japanese and the local people could have enriched this final obser-
vation. For instance, Gerald Horne’s Race War: White Supremacy and the Japa-
nese Attack on the British Empire (New York: New York University Press, 2004),
which curiously is not mentioned by Hotta, examines the multidirectional influ-
ence among Southeast Asian nationalist aspirations, the white supremacist pol-
icies of Western colonialism, and Japanese policies in the region.
Overall, Hotta’s categorization of Pan-Asianism enriches her later examin-
ation of the key events of Japan’s Fifteen Years’ War. While the scope of her
study is confined to the political and literary elite, Hotta extensively documents
the continuing presence of Pan-Asianism in Japan’s policy making. Thus, by
taking up the challenge of accounting for the ideological aspect of Japan’s war,
the book offers a new insight into an often fragmented history of Japan’s
Fifteen Years’ War.
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This history of cultural relations programming in postwar Japan narrates the
intended and unintended impacts of the binational construction of the long,
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“soft” peace that defined U.S.–Japan relations after 1945. While aspects of
Matsuda Takeshi’s argument are underdeveloped, and a few rudimentary
points overly so, the book is nevertheless valuable for its significant realignment
of a robust scholarship on U.S. cultural imperialism by placing Japan at the center
of the discussion.
Matsuda begins his narrative by recounting the early Cold War context of the
Allied occupation and the immediate years after. The book comes into its own in
the fourth chapter by engaging the central role of John D. Rockefeller III in
developing the institutions that were at the heart of the U.S.–Japan cultural
exchange initiatives fostered under the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration.
While the purpose of the cultural diplomatic initiative in Japan was to staunch
what many Americans thought to be a Red tide flowing from the Soviet
Union, the primary impact seems to have been the creation of institutions that
fostered the emergence of a trans-Pacific intellectual elite who were unable to
perceive Japan’s interests outside the context of U.S. Cold War policy.
Matsuda demonstrates the important role that individuals who were deeply
invested in the global U.S. Cold War offensive, such as Rockefeller, Ikeda
Hayato, and Ichimada Hisato, played in the development of Japan’s cultural
exchange institutions. Matsuda argues that the original initiative was partly a
response to the offense taken by many Japanese elites at General Douglas
MacArthur’s “patronizing and condescending view of the Japanese rooted in
racism.” Rockefeller reasoned that a cultural diplomatic mission would
“redress their injured feelings” by showing that “foreigners appreciated and
respected their culture” (p. 105). Importantly, Matsuda illustrates how many of
the institutions that were at the center of Rockefeller’s plan to shape the U.S.–
Japan relationship are still prominent today.
Initially conceived as two separate institutions, one in Tokyo the other in
Kyoto, funding concerns forced organizers to build the International House of
Japan (Kokusai Bunka Kaikan) as a joint cultural exchange and international
student housing facility on a piece of land in the Azabu district of Tokyo. The
founding of the International House is assumed by many today to have been a
foregone conclusion, but well into the planning process, Rockefeller Foundation
president Dean Rusk developed some reservations about the extent to which the
affair was going to appear to be a Japanese initiative. The Japanese planning com-
mittee, handpicked by Rockefeller, had been slow to submit its proposal to the
Rockefeller Foundation, and in April 1952, Rockefeller flew to Japan to broker
the final parts of the deal by informally advising the senior members of the plan-
ning committee, Matsumoto Shigeharu and Takagai Yasaka, “that the Rockefeller
Foundation would be willing to extend financial support of the cultural center
project upon receipt of the specific plans for organization” (p. 133). Importantly,
Rockefeller had to seal the deal with his family’s foundation in New York by
funding the entire $600,000 matching grant with an anonymous donation from
himself.
Building the International House was only one part of the overall U.S. cul-
tural offensive in Japan. Many Allied occupation and U.S. State Department offi-
cials believed that the Japanese suffered from a “spiritual vacuum” in the wake of
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the ultranationalist and militarist ideologies that had dominated public discourse
during the war. American officials were further dismayed by the reemerging
strength of Marxist scholarship and presumed that it was the result of simple
naiveté on the part of an intellectual elite who had lived under a totalitarian
state for too long. Oddly, their solution was to sponsor an eerily Orwellian “Cam-
paign of Truth,” which focused on distributing targeted propaganda to Japanese
historians who were perceived to labor amid hotbeds of Marxism. The effort met
with limited success, but it did lay the groundwork for significant private initiat-
ives that had far longer-lasting influence. Private philanthropic organizations such
as the Ford and Rockefeller foundations collaborated with the U.S. State Depart-
ment initiative by funding Japanese scholars who would promote the ideological
viewpoints preferred by American officials.
American philanthropic institutions also funneled funding and institutional
support to establish American studies research centers in Tokyo and Kyoto.
The semiofficial sponsorship of American studies curricula and scholarship
played a crucial role in developing a business and political elite with a strong
interest in maintaining the status quo. When the rise of popular antinuclear
and anti–Security Treaty movements during the late 1950s threatened to desta-
bilize the U.S.–Japan relationship, prominent members of the American studies
seminars attempted to salve relations at the most elite levels. Matsuda argues,
however, that their cozy relationships with American organizations that were
too closely implicated in the American Cold War effort resulted in a lopsided
pro-Americanism that marginalized critique and rewarded subservience to an
extent that retarded Japan’s potential to develop as a democratic state.
While not specifically addressing the impact that the U.S.–Japan cultural
exchange missions had on popular culture, Matsuda’s study does point toward
a much-needed historicization of the culturalist framework for thinking about
Japan’s role in the world that seems, even now, to dominate international dis-
course. In 2008, the Foreign Ministry attempted to appropriate intense inter-
national interest in Japanese pop culture by making Hello Kitty its official
tourism ambassador, a decision that was greeted with some skepticism and a
touch of derision in the popular press outside Japan. Hello Kitty, which cele-
brated her thirtieth birthday in 2004, has not proven to be the foreign tourism
magnate hoped for by the Foreign Ministry. Matsuda’s study might open the
door to further investigation into the failure of the Hello Kitty initiative, which
may be the result, in part, of institutionalized notions of Japan rooted in the cul-
tural missions of the early postwar era. This book points toward the need for
further study into how the global marketplace for Japan as a cultural icon has
been influenced by perceptions of “Japaneseness” sculpted by the Cold War.
Matsuda has done a good job of narrating the emergence of the various cul-
tural programming initiatives at the heart of the U.S.–Japan relationship during
the early postwar era. Yet the foreword by John W. Dower is crucial to setting the
context of Matsuda’s study, and the book would not communicate many of its key
points without it. Oddly, Matsuda’s appendix reviewing the state of scholarship on
U.S.–Japan relations might have served to overcome some of these shortcomings
had it been included as part of the opening chapter. Despite these weaknesses,
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this book establishes the significance of American cultural diplomacy initiatives in
Japan and serves as an important cautionary tale to those who cite the early
postwar U.S.–Japan relationship as a model of how diplomacy in the aftermath
of conflict ought to be conducted.
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This book is a superb analysis of the ko¯, or cooperative insurance and loan
funds, that were created by Japanese farmers during the early modern era, the
core ethos and practices of which have carried over into the contemporary
economy. Their emergence, sophistication, ubiquity, and endurance are powerful
refutations of views that Japanese commoners were simply the endlessly endur-
ing victims of exploitative governments, on the one hand, or of Mother Nature,
on the other. By the middle of the Edo period, at the latest, the people had come
to the realization that all types of natural disasters were inevitable, that help was
not going to be forthcoming from the government, and that if crop failures,
disease, fire, and other crises were not to automatically cause famine, poverty,
and misery, then the people were going to have to devise some collective
method of breaking that causal chain themselves. That method was the ko¯.
The ko¯ did not develop in a vacuum: by the eighteenth century, many writers
were articulating views that, in a sense, codified existing commoner values and,
further, justified calculated economic behavior that was designed to fulfill
those values and ensure survival at the same time. The indivisibility of morality
and economics, egalitarian and cooperative commitment to collective goals
(including, primarily, survival), and, crucially, the importance of money in
general and commerce in particular were all argued by a variety of commoner
authors. Money was an essential weapon in the battle against poverty, and com-
merce—if pursued fairly and aimed at the collective good—was not dirty, nor
even just permissible, but essential to a moral life.
Which came first—the ko¯ or their justification—is unclear, but in any case, by
the late eighteenth century, villagers throughout Japan had created a wide variety
—in terms of goals, techniques, and memberships—of groups in which people
pooled their contributions and, either in rotation, by application, or in times of
crisis, made withdrawals. There were basically three types of ko¯: simple mutual
insurance schemes, pools of what one might call venture capital, and quasi-
lotteries. Many villagers were members of several at once. They all shared
detailed contractual (albeit informal) commitments, careful calculations of
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